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Offenders in some restorative justice programs are required to offer an apology as a 
condition of successful completion of the restorative justice procedure, or else return to court. 
Apologies can be required even when victims do not attend the restorative justice procedure. 
Apologising can result in several benefits for apologisers, but previous research suggests that 
coercion and lack of victim presence in restorative justice procedures may reduce those benefits. 
Participants (n = 120) took part in a deceptive live study designed to elicit confessions for a 
transgression and subsequent apologies. In this study, I manipulated coercion (Coerced, Not 
coerced) and victim presence (Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), to test their effects on the outcome 
benefits that offenders derived from offering an apology. Findings indicated that victim presence 
and coercion significantly impact outcome benefits for apologisers, including: perceptions of 
personal responsibility, accountability for consequences, transgression exaggeration and 
procedural fairness judgments. Implications for restorative justice programs are discussed.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Restorative justice advocates argue that restorative justice is a process that holds many 
potential benefits for offenders, including: internalisation of responsibility for transgressions and 
greater recognition of the harmful action(s) and consequences (Bazemore & Umbreit, 1995; Choi 
& Stevenson, 2009), enhanced perceptions of apology importance and process finality (Choi & 
Stevenson, 2009; O‟Hara & Yam, 2002), increased value consensus (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009; 
Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather & Platow, 2008), greater perceptions of procedural and outcome 
fairness, and greater satisfaction with procedures and outcomes (Bergseth & Bouffard, 2007; 
Gray, 2003; Latimer, Dowden & Muise, 2005; Tyler, Sherman, Strang, Barnes & Woods, 2007). 
However, no research has explored how elements of restorative justice procedures might 
influence the outcomes experienced by offenders in restorative justice. This research sought to 
develop a greater understanding of restorative justice for offenders by focusing on aspects of the 
conference procedure that psychological research suggests are particularly influential for 
offenders. Specifically, I examined the effects of apology coercion and victim presence on the 
benefits of restorative justice for offenders who apologise.  
Societal Reactions to Transgressions 
 
Notions of justice are generally founded in either retributive or restorative philosophies 
(Wenzel et al., 2008). The focus of retributive justice is to establish blame and determine a 
proportionate punishment (Zehr, 1997). The primary sanctioning objective is the administration 
of punishment deemed justifiably proportionate to the crime (Bazemore & Umbreit, 1995). The 
process of justice is designed to be adversarial, pitting the offender against the state with the 
possibility of only one victor. For example, the criminal justice system in Canada draws upon 





to imprisonment) to a hierarchy of increasingly harmful behaviours. Restorative justice theorists 
argue that the retributive approach has been popular historically because the punitive sanctions 
employed immediately punish, denounce unwanted behaviour and provide norm affirmation 
(Bazemore & Umbreit, 1995). Drawing upon retributive justice principles, the formal criminal 
justice system considers crime to be an offence against the state and holds a monopoly on 
victimisation; deciding who victims are and how they will be represented (Zehr, 1997). 
Restorative Justice 
In contrast to retributive justice, the purpose of restorative justice is to promote the 
restoration of both the victim and offender, as well as reparation of harm done to the community, 
while balancing the needs of offenders, victims and communities (Bergseth & Bouffard, 2007). 
The primary objective of restorative justice is relationship restoration for all parties connected to 
the offence, with bilateral (as opposed to unilateral) power distribution (Braithwaite, 2000). For 
example, participants in restorative justice conferences, though guided by a conference 
facilitator, control the information that is shared during the procedure as well as the outcome of 
the conference. These elements help to level hierarchy between participants as well as 
facilitators. Descriptions of restorative justice state that the model is best understood as a process 
that involves all stakeholders to an offence in a dialogue, which collectively reflects upon and 
resolves the causes and outcomes of a transgression (Braithwaite, 2000; Latimer, Dowden & 
Muise, 2005).  Restorative justice has been proposed as an alternative or complementary system 
of justice to the formal criminal justice system, though some advocates maintain that restorative 
justice actually predates the retributive justice model and was the predominant resolution 





The core principles reviewed above distance restorative justice considerably from 
retributive justice, but restorative justice also employs a very different procedure. The formality 
of court in retributive justice is replaced by a relatively informal conference procedure in 
restorative justice (Braithwaite, 2000). In restorative justice conferences, victims, offenders and 
their supporters, guided by a conference convener, meet to discuss an offence and decide on an 
outcome plan (sanctions) for the offender to complete. First, victims, offenders and their 
respective supporters are led by a conference convenor (or panel) in a discussion of why the 
harm occurred and what the implications were for all parties (Wenzel et al., 2008). The process 
is designed to be reflective, with honesty strongly encouraged so that sanctions that are 
appropriate to both the situation and individual offender can be drafted.  
Sanctions are the tangible outcome of conferences. They are consequences levied on the 
offender for the harm caused and are jointly crafted by all parties to the restorative justice 
conference. Sanctions are intended to serve two fundamental roles: (1) to restore the 
victim/community after the harm that was done, and (2) to encourage personal growth in the 
offender that will help avoid further transgressions (Zehr, 1997). Restorative justice sanctions 
aim to attach meaningful consequences to delinquency, denounce criminality and convey 
expected standards of behaviour while emphasising the importance of relationship restoration for 
the parties involved (Van Ness, 1993). While it is important to communicate to the offender that 
their behaviour was inappropriate, it is also important that any relationships damaged by the 
harmful act(s) be restored as much as possible.   
Conceptually, restorative justice conferences have been described as interaction rituals 
(Sherman et al., 2005). Interaction rituals are social events characterised by the core qualities of: 





a dynamic experience that involves sharing a common purpose. Through this method, restorative 
justice aims to respond differently to crime than does the retributive model. Restorative justice 
gives priority to stakeholder reparation on a case-by-case basis while constructing safer 
communities as a result of the process (Bazemore & Umbreit, 1995). The intention of restorative 
justice is that individual relationships are repaired through the conference procedure while 
acceptable standards of behaviour are communicated to the group. Additionally, the restorative 
model has been touted as fostering a “less punitive, less costly and less stigmatizing” method of 
sanctioning (Bazemore & Umbreit, 1995, p.298). Yet, both advocates and critics question the 
application of restorative justice to some offences (e.g., sexual and domestic violence offences) 
due to concerns associated with victims, such as safety and coercion to participate (Daly & 
Stubbs, 2006; Hudson, 1998). However, overall, advocates of restorative justice maintain that the 
model is a holistic approach to justice that seeks to reintegrate and rehabilitate those in need 
more effectively than does retributive justice (Bazemore & Umbreit, 1995).  
Theoretical Underpinnings of Restorative Justice  
Reintegrative shaming. Although the formal criminal justice system operates on 
principles of proportional retributive justice, criminological theory proposes that this model may 
be detrimental to the offender. It has been argued that offenders experience stigmatisation as a 
result of an encounter with the criminal justice system through the process of labelling. To be 
labelled as a „criminal‟ prompts society to reject the offender, identifying them as different and 
treating them accordingly (Becker, 1963; Links, 1987). Stigmatisation can make reintegration 
into mainstream society difficult (Braithwaite, 2000; Braithwaite & Mugford, 1994; Maruna, 
LeBel, Mitchell & Naples, 2004). By contrast, restorative justice procedures seek to avoid 





Reintegrative shaming seeks to communicate shame for the harmful act while 
maintaining an attitude that is respectful to the offender (Braithwaite & Mugford, 1994). Core 
components of successful reintegrative shaming procedures include: a focus on the event, but not 
on the offender, as bad; the empowerment of participants with process control; and full 
recognition by the offender of the harmful act(s) (Braithwaite & Mugford, 1994). Restorative 
justice adopts the process of reintegrative shaming by emphasising that while the act was 
harmful and wrong, the offender is worthy of redemption (Tyler, Sherman, Strang, Barnes & 
Woods, 2007). Reintegrative shaming is not an isolated component in the restorative justice 
conference; it is an underlying philosophy that guides the procedure. Braithwaite (2000) 
maintains that reintegrative shaming works because it draws together people respected by the 
offender to disapprove of their behaviour constructively, allowing the offender to recognise that 
while their action was wrong, they are still valued.  
Procedural justice. Restorative justice theorists also attribute part of the success of 
restorative justice to its attention to procedural justice concerns. Procedural justice, in the legal 
context, is concerned with evaluations of the application of law; specifically, the extent to which 
a procedure is perceived as fair and satisfactory (Tyler, 1989). Distributive justice refers to the 
extent to which the outcomes of a procedure are perceived as fair and satisfactory. Research has 
demonstrated that procedural and distributive justice evaluations rest heavily on the practices 
employed during a procedure. 
Thibaut and Walker (1978) were the first to systematically investigate procedural justice 
effects in legal contexts and found voice to be a highly influential variable. Voice refers to the 
input or process control a participant is permitted throughout a decision-making procedure. 





people are permitted voice in a decision-making procedure, they judge the procedure and its 
outcome to be more satisfactory and fair (Lind, Kanfer & Earley, 1990; Lind, Tyler & Huo, 
1997). Relational models of procedural justice argue that the effect occurs because voice impacts 
an individual‟s sense of social value and perceived respect (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 
1992).These models posit that voice is valued because the opportunity to offer input implies that 
the participant is a valued member of the group overseeing the procedure (i.e., they are asked to 
provide input because they have an important contribution to offer; Lind, Tyler & Huo, 1997). 
Lind and Tyler‟s (1988) group value model is the dominant relational model of procedural 
justice effects, suggesting that procedures communicate symbolic messages of respect and value 
from the group to the individual. It suggests that treatment by authorities during a procedure (in 
terms of respect, neutrality and standing) influences procedural justice evaluations because group 
membership is very important to the individual (Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz & Lind, 1998; Tyler, 
1994). 
Drawing from the group value model, restorative justice theorists argue that the success 
of restorative justice may hinge upon the respect, neutrality and equal standing demonstrated 
through the inclusion of voice and perceptions of a procedurally just process (Tyler, 2006). A 
key communication in the restorative justice conference is that the criminal act was bad but that 
the offender is a respected person. This lays the foundation for a procedure that engages the 
offender respectfully and with neutrality. Restorative justice conferences require that offenders 
fully acknowledge their harmful act and honestly recount the incident. This process presents the 
opportunity for the offender to exercise voice in an interactive and respectful dialogue, and this 





conference that holds them accountable for their actions while maintaining respect, neutrality 
and equal standing encourages the individual to evaluate the procedure as just. 
Procedural justice has important consequences. Perceptions of procedural justice: increase 
perceptions of satisfaction with outcomes (Mossholder, Bennett & Martin, 1998); heighten 
support for and commitment to decisions (McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992; Tyler & Degoey, 1995); 
lead outcomes to be evaluated as more legitimate (Tyler, Degoey & Smith, 1996); and encourage 
voluntary acceptance of those outcomes (Gibson, 1989; Lind, Tyler & Huo, 1997; Sunshine & 
Tyler, 2003).  Legitimacy is a particularly important component in the legal context. Perceived 
legitimacy of authorities (or institutions) prompts an attitude of compliance with the future 
instructions of those authorities (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Legitimacy engenders voluntary and 
cooperative behaviours, even to unpopular decisions, which translates into a lower likelihood of 
recidivism in the legal context (Gibson, 1989; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Degoey, 1995).   
Evaluations of Restorative Justice 
It has been suggested that restorative justice procedures offer offenders a number of 
beneficial outcomes, including “responsibilisation” effects (which restorative justice researchers 
define as the promotion of greater ownership of and accountability for behaviour; Bazemore & 
Umbreit, 1995; Regehr & Gutheil, 2002; Van Ness, 1993; Wenzel et al., 2008), perceptions of 
value consensus between stakeholders (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009; Wenzel et al., 2008), and 
feelings of remorse and empathy (Bazemore & Umbreit, 1995; Choi & Stevenson, 2009). It has 
also been suggested that communities reap long-term benefits in the form of lower recidivism 
rates. Comparative evaluations have revealed that restorative justice results in greater participant 





comparison to the formal criminal justice system (Bergseth & Bouffard, 2007; Gray, 2003; 
Latimer, Dowden & Muise, 2005; Tyler et al., 2007). Strang and Sherman (2003) conducted 
randomised field tests to better understand victim, offender and community justice concerns. 
Results indicated that restorative justice promoted offender compliance with the law as, or more, 
effectively than conventional court responses, resulting in lower recidivism rates. The high levels 
of participant satisfaction, acceptance of conference sanctions, and future compliance with the 
law following restorative justice are frequently attributed to the model‟s inclusion of 
reintegrative shaming and procedural justice concerns (Braithwaite, 2000). Restorative justice 
advocates, therefore, evoke reintegrative shaming theory and procedural justice literature to 
explain the positive performance of restorative responses in evaluations comparing restorative 
justice to court. However, critics of restorative justice note that these causal assumptions have 
never been tested, and suggest that further investigation is required to identify the factors that 
determine whether restorative procedures will be successful.   
Further Investigation Required in Restorative Justice 
Bergseth and Bouffard (2007) conducted a critical evaluation of the restorative justice 
literature, maintaining that prior evaluations have suffered from a variety of methodological 
shortcomings. Utilising a sample of offenders directed to court versus those diverted to 
restorative justice, the authors compared offenders with similar offense histories to evaluate the 
effectiveness of both responses in reducing recidivism. Recidivism was operationalised as any 
subsequent charge over a four-year follow-up period. Restorative justice was found to result in 
lower recidivism rates during the earlier follow up periods than the formal criminal justice 
system, but after four years, the advantage of restorative justice over court procedures was not 





court. Tyler et al. (2007) cite similar findings from an experimental design comparing restorative 
justice conferences and court procedures as a response to drunk-driving offences. The authors 
found that both restorative and court procedures effectively reduced recidivism rates if they 
employed reintegrative shaming and were perceived as procedurally fair.   
 These studies cast doubt on the widely accepted findings that restorative justice is 
inherently more effective than traditional court procedures. In fact, restorative justice has been 
subject to considerable criticism. It has been argued that restorative procedures have the potential 
to be perceived as intrusive by participants due to the focus on discussion and reflection (Polk, 
1994). The outcome of a restorative procedure perceived as intrusive may be more detrimental to 
offender reintegration than court based procedures. Additionally, Waldman (1999) suggests that 
evaluative studies that have touted the success of restorative justice in comparison to court 
procedures based on participant satisfaction must be approached cautiously. Waldman (1999) 
maintains that marginalised groups tend to define their needs differently than the dominant group 
(e.g., individuals who are minorities may define their needs differently than Caucasians). 
Therefore, we should be very cautious in interpreting data about participant satisfaction, as 
differences in perceived needs could artificially inflate self-reports of satisfaction with the 
outcomes of restorative justice among marginalised groups. While a procedure might receive 
high subjective reports of satisfaction from individual participants, the procedure may not 
necessarily meet either objective or societal standards of justice.  
Collectively, the reviewed literature reveals that we know very little about how or why 
restorative justice works. These concerns highlight the need to understand more about the 





refine these nebulous understandings of restorative justice by exploring how outcome benefits of 
restorative justice for offenders can be affected by particular aspects of the conference procedure.  
Factors affecting the Outcomes of Restorative Justice for Offenders 
 Apology. Apology is the most commonly practiced method used to resolve social 
conflicts, though it is yet to be fully integrated into the formal criminal justice system (Davila, 
2004; McPherson Frantz & Benningson, 2005). In contrast, apology is central to restorative 
justice. Petrucci (2002) argues that because apology directly addresses the harmful act, it may be 
an important component of conflict resolution for both offenders and victims. Haley (1986) 
suggests that while the choice to apologise may be in the pursuit of an end goal, apologies can 
also act as informal sanctions. Apologies serve to confirm truth, suggest compensation or 
restoration possibilities, and clarify blame (Petrucci, 2002). Victims and observers value 
apologies, in part, because they communicate important information about a transgression, 
including demonstrating an acceptance of responsibility by the offender and symbolising respect 
by the offender for the victim (Gold & Weiner, 2000; Thompson, 2005). However, some 
apologies are more effective than others.  
   Research consistently finds that apologies that are accepted by the intended recipient(s) 
tend to include remorse, acceptance of responsibility, and empathy (Brown, 2003; Choi & 
Stevenson, 2009; Coombs & Holladay, 2008; O‟Hara & Yam, 2002; Petrucci, 2002; Regehr & 
Gutheil, 2002). Offenders who offer sincere apologies to receptive recipients are believed to 
experience a variety of outcome benefits. Sincere apologies are associated with greater 
ownership over past actions, as well as feelings of shame and regret by offenders (Choi & 





process fosters empathy for the victim(s). Feelings of empathy encourage understanding for the 
victim‟s experience and recognition of harm caused by the wrong-doing (Choi & Stevenson, 
2009). Value consensus, the belief that community norms and acceptable standards of behaviour 
are shared between conference participants, is experienced between parties to a successful 
apology (Okimoto, Wenzel & Feather, 2009). Value consensus is communicated through 
dialogue. Perceptions of value consensus offer benefits to all parties involved, allowing 
apologisers to feel accepted and apology recipients to feel respected. This shared understanding 
offers conference participants the opportunity to satisfyingly rectify the injustice from the 
perspective of all stakeholders (Okimoto, Wenzel & Feather, 2009). Finally, apologisers report a 
sense of accomplishment that is connected to the perception of process finality (Choi & 
Stevenson, 2009; O‟Hara & Yam, 2002). The self-respect generated from this accomplishment 
may be drawn upon by the offender to support effective community reintegration.   
Research has therefore established that an apology by an offender to a victim can lead to 
benefits for the offender. However, there are two common features of restorative justice 
procedures that may quality the benefits of apology for offenders: victim presence and apology 
coercion.  
Victim presence. First, although restorative justice conferences would ideally include 
victims, this is not always the case. In Ontario, restorative justice conferences will proceed 
without a victim present, and when victims are unable or unwilling to attend, the offender is still 
expected to offer an apology as a condition of their participation in the program (Ministry of 
Child and Youth Services, 2010). This means that offenders may have conferences where only 
they and the conference facilitator(s) are present but the offender is still required to draft a 





offender will have very little insight into the victim‟s experience when crafting their apology. 
Without a victim‟s voice in the restorative justice procedure to inspire offender accountability 
and personal reflection, the apology may fail to yield the outcome benefits associated with 
genuine and successful apologies. Despite these concerns, we have a limited understanding of 
whether victim presence actually influences apology outcome benefits for apologisers.     
Taft (2000) suggests that the primary pattern through which remorse is expressed is 
dyadic – referring to an interaction involving the offender and victim. When an offender delivers 
an apology to an absent victim the outcome benefits associated with apology and restorative 
justice may be permanently lost. Umbreit‟s (1998) research on victim and offender experiences 
with restorative justice supports this assertion. Offenders and their supporters reported that 
victim presence during the restorative justice conference was important because it presented the 
opportunity for the victim-offender relationship to be repaired through apology and forgiveness. 
Furthermore, offenders and their supporters indicated that victim presence was important to help 
the offender recognise the harm they had caused and to hold themselves accountable for the 
wrong done. Gray (2005) elaborates on the importance of victim presence for restorative justice, 
suggesting that a conference can only be fully restorative if there is direct contact between the 
offender and victim. Victim presence directly addresses the harm the offender has caused and 
holds the individual responsible for their actions while also demonstrating a desire to resolve the 
conflict. Gray (2005) suggests that victim presence assists the offender in community 
reintegration.  
The studies discussed above can be used to inform our understanding of the importance 
of victim presence for apologisers. When offenders offer an apology in a restorative justice 





sincere apology. The absence of victim voice may attenuate outcome benefits of sincere 
apologies (i.e., acknowledgment of and accountability for the harm done). Given that restorative 
justice conferences sometimes occur where the direct victim(s) are either unwilling or unable to 
attend, inviting a surrogate victim to attend the conference may be a viable means to include 
victim voice in proceedings in which  it would otherwise be absent, thus enhancing apology 
outcome benefits for offenders. Surrogate victim presence can be practiced in restorative justice 
by inviting victim impact panels or community members to attend the conference and convey a 
victim-like voice and experience to the offender (Bergseth & Bouffard, 2007). However, no 
research to date has examined whether the presence of a surrogate victim allows an offender to 
experience the same outcome benefits of apology that they would experience if interacting 
directly with the actual victim of their transgression.  
 Apology coercion. A second factor that may affect the outcome benefits of apology for 
offenders is the level of coercion used in the process of generating the apology. Apologies are 
offered for two fundamental reasons: As a means to an end (instrumental) or as an end in and of 
itself (non-instrumental; Folger & Konovsky, 1989). Scholars have argued that when apologies 
serve an instrumental function (e.g., when they are a legal requirement) they lose the effect they 
would have as a meaningful interaction (i.e., outcome benefits for all parties are significantly 
diminished; Petrucci, 2002; Taft, 2000). For this reason, the inclusion of apology in judicial 
proceedings has been questioned (Regehr & Gutheil, 2002).  
As noted previously, restorative justice conferences may require an offer of apology from 
the offender. In addition, in Ontario, offenders are offered the opportunity to participate in 
restorative justice as an alternative to the formal criminal justice system (Ministry of Child and 





components of the restorative justice program (including apology), they will be returned to the 
formal criminal justice system. Under these circumstances, it is very possible that an apology 
will only be offered in the restorative justice conference to fulfill the instrumental purpose of 
avoiding further contact with the formal criminal justice system. Including apology as a 
requirement of restorative justice procedures may thus prompt offenders to perceive the call for 
apology as coercive. No research has examined whether coercion actually reduces the outcome 
benefits of apology for offenders. However, cognitive dissonance theory suggests a mechanism 
by which such coercion would attenuate the beneficial effects of apology for offenders who 
apologise.  
 Cognitive dissonance refers to the psychological state experienced by an individual when 
their actions and cognitions are at odds with each other (Egan, Santos & Bloom, 2007). When an 
individual‟s behaviours and thoughts are not aligned an aversive state of internal inconsistency 
develops. Psychological discomfort is the resultant experience and, in the pursuit of internal 
consistency, individuals will try to reduce this dissonance (Elliot & Devine, 1994; Harmon-
Jones, Brehm, Greenberg, Simon & Nelson, 1995; Stone & Cooper, 2001).  Festinger‟s (1957) 
original theory of cognitive dissonance states that cognitive alterations will result when an 
individual experiences a sufficient amount of dissonance. There are components of this theory 
that have been questioned, but a consistent finding regarding dissonance reduction strategies 
exists: When little incentive is offered for an individual to act in ways that oppose his or her 
beliefs, there is a greater chance that the individual will engage in a dissonance reduction 
strategy that involves changing their belief system to alleviate the resultant discomfort (Harmon-
Jones et al., 1995). Greater incentives do not encourage the individual to engage a dissonance 





 Cognitive dissonance theory can inform our understanding of apology outcome benefits 
for apologisers. When offenders offer an apology in a restorative justice setting wholly for the 
instrumental purpose of avoiding further contact with the criminal justice system, they could 
justify their apology in terms of the negative consequence they have avoided. Justification may 
prevent effective resolution of cognitive dissonance and nullify the offender‟s ability to 
experience outcome benefits of the apology. 
Significance of the Present Study 
 
This research project used an experimental psychology paradigm to test whether victim 
presence and coercion to apologise affect the benefits that offenders experience when they 
apologise for transgressions in a restorative justice conference. This research enhances our 
understanding of the outcome benefits of apology for offenders in restorative justice conferences 
by identifying specific conditions under which the offender is more likely to experience outcome 
benefits.  
This investigation provides evidence-based policy implications for restorative justice 
procedures, which may enhance outcome benefits for offenders. Further, manipulating both 
victim presence and coercion in a fully-crossed design allowed us to test how the two variables 
interact with one another in restorative justice contexts. Assuming that apology coercion 
eliminates the possibility of cognitive dissonance, it is expected that a floor effect would be 
created, stunting any subsequent benefits that may have been achieved through the various levels 
of victim presence. Under coercion, the offender may become less likely to internalise any aspect 
of the apology and, therefore, regardless of whether victim presence is direct, surrogate or 
absent, the cognitive dissonance, which prompts apologisers to reflect upon their actions and 





presence would be apparent only when apologies were not coerced, and that all benefits of victim 
presence would be nullified when apologies were coerced.  
Drawing from the research reviewed above, the following hypothesis was tested in this 
study: The effect of victim presence on apology outcome benefits for offenders depends on 
whether the apology is offered under coercion. When the apology is not offered under 
coercion, victim presence has an effect on benefits – outcome benefits are greater when the 
apology is delivered to a direct or surrogate victim than when the apology is directed to no 
one in particular. However, when the apology is offered under coercion, victim presence 
has no effect on benefits – outcome benefits are no different when the apology is delivered 































Chapter 2: Method 
 
Design 
The study was conducted as a 3 (Victim: Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous) x 2 (Apology: 
Coerced, Not Coerced) between-subjects experimental design, with participants randomly 
assigned to conditions. Victim presence was manipulated so that participants were told that they 
were either interacting with the victim of their transgression (Direct victim condition), a 
representative of that victim (Surrogate victim condition), or no specific victim was identified to 
the participant (Ambiguous victim condition). Apology coercion was manipulated so that 
participants were either told that they would suffer a severe negative consequence (an academic 
misconduct charge) if they failed to write an apology (Coerced condition), or that they would 
suffer no negative consequence if they chose not to write an apology (Not Coerced condition).  
Apology outcome benefits were the focus of the dependent measures, though procedural 
and distributive fairness measures were included as well. The constructs assessed as dependent 
variables were: internalisation of responsibility, responsibilisation, apology importance, 
transgression finality, value consensus, and procedural and outcome fairness. Internalisation of 
responsibility refers to the extent to which an internal or external locus of control was adopted to 
explain involvement in the incident, and the internalisation of responsibility measure was drawn 
from Coombs and Holladay (2002; Cronbach‟s α =.91). The responsibilisation measure probed 
for responses employed by the participant after the consequences of the transgression were 
revealed and was derived from a larger empathy scale used by Mehrabiam and Epstein (1972; 
empathy scale Cronbach‟s α = .84). The measure of apology importance, which assessed 
perceived impact of the apology as well as perceptions of transgression finality, was drawn from 





extent to which the participant perceived the victim to share similar standards of behaviour and 
social values as themselves and was drawn from Wenzel and Okimoto (2009; Cronbach‟s α = 
.71). Finally, the procedural and outcome fairness measures were drawn from Heuer, Penrod, 
Hafer and Cohn (2002; fair procedures scale Cronbach‟s α = .89; fair outcomes scale Cronbach‟s 
α = .87). Respectively, the measures evaluated the extent to which the procedure used to generate 
the apology, and the outcome that followed offering the apology, were perceived as favourable.   
Participants  
Introductory Psychology students (n = 153) at the University of Ontario Institute of 
Technology participated in exchange for course credit. No participants were excluded from 
participation based on sex, race, age or any other characteristic.  
Procedure and Materials 
The procedure for this study was based on that used by Kassin and Kiechel (1996). The 
study was advertised to participants under the name “Typing Task”. Upon arrival at the 
experiment, participants were asked for verbal consent to participate and were told that the study 
was concerned with typing ability (i.e., the speed and accuracy with which people can type 
spoken text). The participant was then asked to complete a “Typing History Questionnaire” (see 
Appendix A). While the participant completed this document, Confederate I entered the lab, 
pretending to be another participant who signed up for the same experimental session. Upon 
Confederate I‟s arrival, the experimenter asked for Confederate I‟s verbal consent to participate 
and requested that they also complete the typing history questionnaire.   
After both the participant and Confederate I completed the materials, the participant was 
told that they had been randomly selected to type first while their partner (Confederate I) dictated 





room 1 and directed the participant to sit in front of the computer while Confederate I sat in the 
other chair provided. After providing some basic instruction, the experimenter stated that there 
was a glitch in the program and emphasised that no one should hit the ALT key because this 
would cause all recent data to be lost, with very negative implications for the research project. 
After the experimenter left private experiment room I, Confederate I read out the 
instructions on the typing test materials, which reiterated the instructions provided by the 
experimenter, and asked the participant if they were ready to begin (see Appendix B). The mock 
typing task was administered via MediaLab. MediaLab prompted the participant to proceed to 
the “typing” screen. When the participant came to the “typing” screen, Confederate I read the 
sentences on the typing test materials at a pace of approximately 90 words per minute (faster 
than the average person‟s typing ability). If the participant asked Confederate I to slow down, the 
comment was acknowledged (Confederate I smiled and nodded their head) but retained the same 
pace. After the participant had been typing for 90 seconds, MediaLab moved to a “blue screen of 
death”, indicating that the program had crashed. At this point, Confederate I leaned in and said: 
“I saw you hit the ALT key.” 
The experimenter waited a few moments upon hearing the typing stop and then called 
out: “Is everything okay?” before re-entering private experiment room I, looking at the screen 
and saying: “What happened?” The Confederate I responded “I saw him/her hit the ALT key and 
then the screen just went blue”.  At this point the experimenter asked the participant whether 
they hit the ALT key. If the participant denied hitting the ALT key, the experimenter reminded 
them that they was typing fast, and asked if it was possible that they hit the ALT key without 
realising it. Confederate I also reiterated their eyewitness testimony by stating: “I definitely saw 





At this point, the victim presence manipulation was introduced. In the Direct victim 
condition, the experimenter stated that the lost information was “part of my thesis research, it‟s 
been funded through a grant and the preliminary report is due next week. I can‟t possibly meet 
the deadline without that data”. In the Surrogate victim condition, the experimenter stated that 
the lost information was “part of another student‟s, Kamille‟s, thesis research. It‟s been funded 
through a grant, and the preliminary report is due next week. She can‟t possibly meet the 
deadline without that data”. In the Ambiguous victim condition, the experimenter stated that the 
lost information was “part of a research project at the university that has been funded through a 
grant. Preliminary reports are due next week and the deadline can‟t possibly be met without that 
data”.    
The experimenter then sought a signed confession from the participant by scrawling “I hit 
the ALT key and data was lost” on a piece of notebook paper. The terminology of the 
experimenter‟s spoken request varied based on the victim presence manipulation. In the Direct 
victim condition, the experimenter requested that the participant sign the note to let “my 
supervisor know what happened”. In the Surrogate victim condition, the experimenter requested 
that the participant sign the note to let “Kamille‟s supervisor know what happened”. In the 
Ambiguous victim condition, the experimenter requested that the participant sign the note to let 
“the lab supervisor know what happened”. (Regardless of victim condition, if the participant 
refused to sign the confession on the first request, the experimenter requested the signature one 
additional time before terminating the experiment and moving to debriefing.) 
After obtaining the signed confession, the experimenter informed Confederate I that the 
study would not be able to finish today and that they were free to go but asked the participant to 





Confederate I asked: “Do I still get my credit for this?” The experimenter responded “Yes. I‟ll 
take care of that once this gets sorted out” and Confederate I then exited the lab. The 
experimenter then picked up a binder labelled „Lab Protocol‟ from a shelf in the main lab room 
and checked the Table of Contents before leafing through the binder to the „Lost Data Protocol‟ 
page. There were, in fact, two „Lost Data Protocol‟ pages. The page that the experimenter turned 
to differed based on the coercion manipulation. Both conditions contained identical „Lost Data 
Protocol‟ pages with the exception that in the coerced condition (see Appendix C-1), the first 
consequence listed for a loss of data is an “Academic Misconduct Violation” while the Not 
coerced „Lost Data Protocol‟ page does not list this consequence (see Appendix C-2). The page 
outlined the procedure following a loss of data and instructed the experimenter to contact the lab 
supervisor.  
After reading the “Lost Data Protocol” page, the experimenter stated that they would 
need to contact the lab supervisor while the participant waited. The language of this exchange 
varied based on the victim presence manipulation. In the Direct victim condition, the 
experimenter informed the participant that “The protocol says I need to contact my lab 
supervisor”. In the Surrogate victim condition, the experimenter informed the participant that 
“The protocol says I need to contact Kamille‟s lab supervisor”. In the Ambiguous victim 
condition, the experimenter informed the participant that “The protocol says I need to contact the 
lab supervisor”. 
The experimenter left the binder open on the main lab room table beside the participant 
before walking across the room to “telephone” the lab supervisor. The experimenter staged a 
phone call to the “lab supervisor” from the telephone in the main lab area and engaged in a brief, 





prompt manipulation. Based on the apology prompt condition, the experimenter requested a 
written apology from the participant. 
In the Coerced condition, the experimenter informed the participant that the situation 
merited being reported to the academic misconduct committee for a violation of conduct within a 
laboratory, which could result in a decision of academic misconduct. The experimenter 
proceeded with the call for apology based on the victim presence manipulation. In the Direct 
victim condition, the experimenter told the participant that “My supervisor is really upset and 
although this could be considered a case of academic misconduct, she said that if you write an 
apology that I could submit to my grant funding committee you can totally avoid escalating it to 
that level”. In the Surrogate victim condition, the experimenter told the participant that 
“Kamille‟s supervisor is really upset and although this could be considered a case of academic 
misconduct, she said that if you write an apology that Kamille could submit to her grant funding 
committee you can totally avoid escalating it to that level”. In the Ambiguous victim condition, 
the experimenter told the participant that “The lab supervisor is really upset and although this 
could be considered a case of academic misconduct, she said that if you write an apology that 
could be submitted to the research‟s grant funding committee you can totally avoid escalating it 
to that level”.  
In the Not coerced condition, the experimenter did not mention a possibility of academic 
misconduct but simply requested an apology from the participant based on the victim presence 
manipulation. In the Direct victim condition, the experimenter told the participant that “My 
supervisor is really upset, she‟s asked if you would mind writing an apology that I could submit 
to my grant funding committee. But there‟s no negative consequence if you don‟t want to – it‟s 





that “Kamille‟s supervisor is really upset, she‟s asked if you would mind writing an apology that 
Kamille could submit to her grant funding committee. But there‟s no negative consequence if 
you don‟t want to – it‟s completely up to you”. In the Ambiguous victim condition, the 
experimenter told the participant that “The lab supervisor is really upset, she‟s asked if you 
would mind writing an apology that could be submitted to the grant funding committee for the 
research. But there‟s no negative consequence if you don‟t want to – it‟s completely up to you”.  
In all conditions, the experimenter requested that all written apologies: (1) identify the 
victim, (2) offer condolences, (3) accept responsibility, and (4) acknowledge the impact of their 
actions. (Regardless of victim condition, if the participant refused to offer a written apology, the 
experimenter made the request once more, noting that the participant is only explaining what 
they have already acknowledged happened through their signed “confession”. If the participant 
still refused to write an apology after this prompt, the experimenter terminated the experiment 
and moved to debriefing.)  
If the participant agreed to write an apology then the experimenter led the participant to 
private experiment room II to complete this task. After exiting private experiment room II, the 
experimenter sent an instant message to Confederate II who was waiting in a meeting room 
down the hall. Confederate II walked down the hall a few minutes later and the experimenter 
called out to them. The experimenter and Confederate II staged a brief discussion within earshot 
of the participant about Confederate II‟s “research”. The conversation suggested that the 
participant might be suitable for this “different” study and Confederate II agreed to wait and see 
if the participant might be interested in doing this research project instead. Both the experimenter 
and Confederate II waited quietly at the main lab door for the participant to emerge with their 





time to write the letter and expressed that the apology was greatly appreciated. The experimenter 
then introduced the participant to Confederate II and the idea of taking part in a different study, 
stating that there has been difficulty in recruiting participants for this other study. The 
experimenter asked the participant if they would be interested in taking part in an alternative 
study in a different lab. While the experimenter introduced the participant to the idea of taking 
part in a different study, Confederate II interrupted the experimenter to describe the alternative 
research project as “a quick questionnaire that assesses responses following transgressions”, and 
stated that if the participant just offered an apology, they would be ideal for this “alternative” 
study. (If the participant refused to complete the additional questionnaire, then the experiment 
was terminated and the participant was fully debriefed.)  
If the participant agreed to complete the questionnaire, then Confederate II led the 
participant to a separate lab space to complete the “alternative” study. As Confederate II and the 
participant entered the new lab space, Confederate II unobtrusively measured the participant‟s 
level of internalisation of the confession. Internalisation of confession is the degree to which the 
participant actually believed that they committed the transgression to which they confessed. 
Confederate II solicited a description from the participant of the transgression while recording 
the participant‟s description of the incident via laptop. As Confederate II and the participant 
walked into the new experiment room, Confederate II said to the participant “Alana told me there 
was a problem with the experiment – what happened?” The participant‟s reply was audio 
recorded on Confederate II‟s laptop. As soon as the experimental session was over, Confederate 
II, who was blind to the participant‟s condition, transcribed the audio-recording of the 
participant‟s reply, without identifying information, and destroyed the original recording. This 





participant condition used the transcriptions to code participants for internalisation of 
responsibility for the incident. In coding, any reply that was qualified by “the experimenter said”, 
or “I may have” was not taken as evidence of internalisation. Responses such as “I hit the ALT 
key”, or “I wrecked the experiment” were taken as evidence of internalisation.  
After soliciting and audio-recording this description from the participant, Confederate II 
then gave the participant the questionnaire (see Appendix D-1 for the questionnaire organised by 
construct, see Appendix D-2 for the questionnaire as it was presented to participants) and 
explained to the participant what the questionnaire required. The questionnaire instructed 
participants to think of a recent situation in which they offered an apology for their behaviour, 
and Confederate II added to this instruction verbally by requesting that the participant think of 
the incident in which they were just involved “because it fits the study‟s purpose”. The 
participant was asked to notify Confederate II when they had completed the questionnaire.  
When the participant completed the questionnaire, the experiment was over. Confederate 
II then appeared to lead the participant back to the main lobby area but, in doing so, passed by 
the original lab where the original experimenter has been waiting. Upon seeing the participant, 
the experiment called out for the participant to come back in for a moment. 
Before debriefing, the experimenter asked the participant four questions as suspicion 
checks. These questions are: (1) Did anything seem odd or strange about the instructions or any 
other part of the research? (2) Did anything in this study seem unclear or confusing? (3) At any 
point during this study, did you doubt what you were being told? (4) Do you have a guess as to 
what this study is about? Participants who indicated knowledge of the deception, suspicion about 





 The experimenter then extensively debriefed the participant. In particular, participants 
were debriefed in detail about the deception and manipulations (the mock transgression and false 
eyewitness statement, the true nature of the study, and the manipulations of victim presence and 
coercion). Once the participant had been informed of the true nature of the study, they were 
given the opportunity to withdraw from the study and opt to have their data excluded from the 
study. If they did not decide to withdraw from the study, participants were asked to sign an 
informed consent form (see Appendix E). Participants were also given a debriefing form to take 
home with them if they wished (see Appendix F). All participants were thanked for their 




















Chapter 3: Results 
Manipulation Checks  
 A total of 153 participants took part in the study, with data from 33 of those participants 
discarded. Of those 33 participants, 13 people indicated during debriefing that they believed the 
study to be deceptive. Six of the 33 participants failed to correctly respond to categorical victim 
presence or coercion manipulation checks in the questionnaire. Finally, 14 of the 33 participants 
had to be debriefed before completing the study due to miscellaneous problems that arose in the 
experimental session (e.g., the participant recognised the confederate, refused to write an 
apology or complete the alternative research project, was excessively agitated, or breached 
procedure by actually hitting the ALT key). After removing data from these 33 participants, 120 
cases were included in the final analyses. 
 The final 120 participants were coded as having internalised responsibility for the 
transgression or not based on the responses they gave to the confederate before completing the 
“alternative research project”. Of the 120 participants, 89 were coded as internalising and 31 
were coded as not internalising. To test whether the effects of coercion and victim presence 
differed depending on whether participants internalised the transgression, internalisation serves 
as a third independent variable in the two-way ANOVAs reported below.      
Two-way ANOVAs revealed that the victim presence and coercion manipulations were 
both effective. A 3 (Victim presence: Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), x 2 (Coercion: Coerced, 
Not coerced), x 2 (Internalisation: Internalised, Not internalised) between groups ANOVA was 
conducted with coercion as the dependent variable. There was a statistically significant main 
effect of coercion, F(1, 108) = 115.30, p = <.001, indicating that the coercion manipulation was 





higher than the not coerced condition (M = 2.48, SD = 1.92). Participants in the coerced 
condition indicated greater perceptions of coercion than participants in the not coerced condition. 
There were no further significant main or interaction effects.   
A second 3 (Victim presence: Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), x 2 (Coercion: Coerced, 
Not coerced), x 2 (Internalisation: Internalised, Not internalised) between groups ANOVA was 
conducted with victim familiarity as the dependent variable. There was a statistically significant 
main effect of victim presence, F(2, 108) = 9.15, p = <.001, indicating that the victim presence 
manipulation was effective.  Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the 
mean score for participants in the direct victim condition (M = 4.30, SD = 2.26) was significantly 
higher than that of participants in the surrogate (M = 2.26, SD = 1.74; p = .01) and ambiguous (M 
= 2.62, SD = 1.93; p = .01) victim conditions. Participants in the surrogate and ambiguous victim 
conditions did not differ significantly from each other. There were no further significant main 
effects. This result suggests that the manipulations in this study worked as intended.  
However, a significant interaction effect was found between victim presence and 
internalisation, F(2, 108) = 3.51, p = .03 (see Figure 1). Further one way ANOVAs revealed no 
significant effects of victim presence on victim familiarity among participants who internalised 
the transgression, but among participants who did not internalise the transgression, there was a 
statistically significant difference, F (2, 28) = 9.69, p = .001. Post hoc comparisons using the 
Tukey HSD test indicated that when participants did not internalise responsibility for the 
transgression, the mean score for participants in the direct victim condition (M = 5.23, SD = 
1.62) was significantly higher than that of participants in the surrogate (M = 1.79, SD = 1.64; p = 
.001) and ambiguous (M = 2.82, SD = 1.70; p = .01) victim conditions. These findings indicate 





apology directly to the victim of their actions reported greater perceptions of victim familiarity 
than participants who offered their apology to a surrogate victim or no one in particular. Among 
those who did internalise the transgression, victim presence had no effect on victim familiarity. 
In addition, t-tests revealed that there were no significant effects of internalisation on victim 
familiarity among participants in the surrogate and ambiguous victim conditions, but participants 
in the direct victim condition had significantly higher scores on victim familiarity when they did 
not internalise responsibility for committing the transgression (M = 5.23, SD = 1.62) than when 
they did internalise (M = 3.36, SD = 2.26; t(38) = 2.58, p = .01). This interaction effect indicates 
that victim presence moderated the effect of internalisation on victim familiarity: Participants 
who did not internalise responsibility for the transgression indicated greater perceptions of victim 
familiarity than those who did internalise, but this difference was only significant in the direct 
victim condition. There were no further significant interaction effects. 
 
 
Figure 1 Victim presence x internalisation on victim familiarity scale. 
































 Eleven constructs were measured through the questionnaire items, of which one construct 
(voice) was measured using a single item. Of the remaining ten constructs, the items for eight 
constructs had good internal consistency (see Table 1). 
Table 1 
     
      Reliability Tests of Scales       
      
Scale     # of Items 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
      Personal responsibility 5 
 
0.86 
Internal accountability  6 
 
0.80 
Transgression finality  2 
 
0.89 


















Outcome satisfaction 2 
 
0.85 
Transgression ramification  3 
 
0.45 
Impact of apology   3   0.49 
 
Two scales (transgression ramification and impact of apology) were found to have low 
internal consistency. As a result, the items that made up these scales were analysed separately.     
Tests of Hypothesis 
 A series of two-way ANOVAs were conducted to test the hypothesis: The effect of 
victim presence on apology outcome benefits for offenders depends on whether the apology is 
offered under coercion. Specifically, I predicted that apology outcome benefits would vary based 
on victim presence only when the apology was not coerced (with direct and surrogate victim 
conditions resulting in greater outcome benefits than the ambiguous victim condition). I 





was offered under coercion. Because some participants did not internalise the transgression, 
internalisation was included as a third independent variable in the analyses to test whether 
internalisation moderated the effects of victim presence and coercion on outcome benefits. As all 
of the results described below indicate, I did not find support for the hypothesis; coercion and 
victim presence did not interact to affect any of the dependent measures in this study. However, 
victim presence, coercion and internalisation did produce several interesting effects.  
Effects of victim presence, coercion and internalisation on personal responsibility. A 
3 (Victim presence: Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), x 2 (Coercion: Coerced, Not coerced), x 2 
(Internalisation: Internalised, Not internalised) between groups ANOVA was conducted with the 
personal responsibility scale as the dependent variable. There was a statistically significant main 
effect of victim presence, F(2, 108) = 4.21, p = .02, with the means for the direct (M = 4.50, SD 
= 1.31) and ambiguous (M = 4.59, SD = 1.57) victim conditions appearing higher than the mean 
for the surrogate victim condition (M = 3.46, SD = 1.57), but post hoc comparisons using the 
Tukey HSD test did not indicate significant differences between groups. No further significant 
main effects were found. A statistically significant interaction effect was found between victim 
presence and internalisation, F(2, 108) = 3.49, p = .03 (See Figure 2).    
Interaction of victim presence and internalisation. Further one way ANOVAs revealed 
no significant effects of victim presence on personal responsibility among participants who 
internalised the transgression, but among participants who did not internalise the transgression, 







Figure 2 Victim presence x internalisation on personal responsibility. 
 
 
Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that when participants did not 
internalise responsibility for the transgression, the mean score for participants in the ambiguous 
victim condition (M = 4.97, SD = 1.59) was significantly higher than that of participants in the 
surrogate victim condition (M = 2.74, SD = 1.22; p = .02). Participants in the direct victim 
condition (M = 4.58, SD = 1.51) did not differ significantly from either surrogate or ambiguous 
victim conditions. These findings indicate that, among participants who did not internalise the 
transgression, those who offered their apology to no one in particular reported greater 
perceptions of personal responsibility than participants who offered their apology to a surrogate 
victim. Among those who did internalise the transgression, victim presence had no effect on 
personal responsibility.  
In addition, t-tests revealed that there were no significant effects of internalisation on 
personal responsibility among participants in the direct and ambiguous victim conditions, but 





































responsibility when they internalised responsibility for committing the transgression (M = 4.17, 
SD = 1.57) than when they did not internalise (M = 2.74, SD = 1.22; t(38) = -2.04, p = .05). 
These findings indicate that victim presence moderated the effect of internalisation on personal 
responsibility: Participants who internalised responsibility for the transgression felt greater 
personal responsibility than those who did not, but this difference was only significant in the 
surrogate victim condition.          
Effects of victim presence, coercion and internalisation on accountability for 
consequences. A 3 (Victim presence: Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), x 2 (Coercion: Coerced, 
Not coerced), x 2 (Internalisation: Internalised, Not internalised) between groups ANOVA was 
conducted with the accountability for consequences scale as the dependent variable. Statistically 
significant main effects were found for victim presence, F(2, 108) = 8.49, p = <.001, and 
coercion, F(1, 108) = 8.85, p = .004. Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated 
that the mean score for the direct victim condition (M = 6.29, SD = 0.83) was significantly higher 
than both the ambiguous (M = 5.73, SD = 1.26; p = .02) and surrogate (M = 5.20, SD = 0.89; p = 
.03) victim conditions. Participants in the direct victim condition indicated greater accountability 
for consequences than participants in the ambiguous and surrogate victim conditions. The mean 
score in the coerced condition (M = 6.05, SD = 0.92) was significantly higher than the not 
coerced condition (M = 5.43, SD = 1.17). Participants in the coerced condition indicated higher 
accountability for consequences of the transgression than participants in the not coerced 
condition. Two interaction effects were statistically significant: coercion by internalisation, F(1, 
108) = 7.22, p = .01 (see Figure 3), and victim presence by internalisation, F(2, 108) = 8.35, p = 





Interaction of coercion and internalisation. While the omnibus test for the coercion x 
internalisation interaction was significant, further t-tests did not reveal any significant differences 
between individual conditions (see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3 Coercion x internalisation on accountability for consequences.  
  
Interaction of victim presence and internalisation. Further one way ANOVAs revealed 
no significant effects of victim presence on accountability for consequences among participants 
who did not internalise the transgression, but among participants who did internalise, there was a 
statistically significant difference in accountability for consequences according to victim 





































Figure 4 Victim presence x internalisation on accountability for consequences.  
 
 
Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that when participants 
internalised responsibility for the transgression, the mean score for participants in the direct 
victim condition (M = 6.28, SD = 0.82) was higher than that of participants in the ambiguous 
victim condition (M = 5.29, SD = 1.28; p = .001). Participants in the surrogate victim condition 
(M = 5.86, SD = 0.70) did not differ significantly from participants in either direct or ambiguous 
victim conditions. These findings indicate that, among participants who internalised the 
transgression, those who offered their apology directly to a victim of their actions reported 
greater perceptions of accountability for consequences of the transgression than participants who 
offered their apology to no one in particular. Among those who did not internalise the 
transgression, victim presence had no effect on accountability for consequences.  
Effects of victim presence, coercion and internalisation on transgression finality. A 3 
(Victim presence: Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), x 2 (Coercion: Coerced, Not coerced), x 2 



































transgression finality scale as the dependent variable. No statistically significant main or 
interaction effects were found.   
Effects of victim presence, coercion and internalisation on perceived voice. A 3 
(Victim presence: Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), x 2 (Coercion: Coerced, Not coerced), x 2 
(Internalisation: Internalised, Not internalised) between groups ANOVA was conducted with 
perceived voice as the dependent variable, as measured by a single continuous item. A 
statistically significant main effect was found for internalization, F(1, 108) = 5.20, p = .03.  The 
mean score among participants who internalised the transgression (M = 4.84, SD = 1.93) was 
significantly lower than the mean for participants who did not internalise (M = 5.78, SD = 1.61). 
Participants who did not internalise responsibility for committing the transgression indicated that 
they were able to express their opinion to a greater extent than participants who internalised 
responsibility. No further main effects or interaction effects were found.  
Effects of victim presence, coercion and internalisation on value consensus. A 3 
(Victim presence: Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), x 2 (Coercion: Coerced, Not coerced), x 2 
(Internalisation: Internalised, Not internalised) between groups ANOVA was conducted with the 
value consensus scale as the dependent variable. No statistically significant main or interaction 
effects were found.   
Effects of victim presence, coercion and internalisation on procedural fairness. A 3 
(Victim presence: Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), x 2 (Coercion: Coerced, Not coerced), x 2 
(Internalisation: Internalised, Not internalised) between groups ANOVA was conducted with the 
procedural fairness scale as the dependent variable. There was a statistically significant main 





test indicated that the mean score for the direct victim condition (M = 5.78, SD = 1.52) was 
significantly higher than the surrogate victim condition (M = 4.78, SD = 1.23; p = .04). The 
ambiguous victim condition (M = 5.33, SD = 1.37) did not differ significantly from either of the 
direct or surrogate victim conditions. Participants in the direct victim condition reported the 
process in which they offered their apology to be fairer than did participants in the surrogate 
victim condition. There were no further significant main or interaction effects. 
Effects of victim presence, coercion and internalisation on procedural satisfaction. A 
3 (Victim presence: Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), x 2 (Coercion: Coerced, Not coerced), x 2 
(Internalisation: Internalised, Not internalised) between groups ANOVA was conducted with the 
procedural satisfaction scale as the dependent variable. No statistically significant main or 
interaction effects were found.   
Effects of victim presence, coercion and internalisation on outcome fairness. A 3 
(Victim presence: Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), x 2 (Coercion: Coerced, Not coerced), x 2 
(Internalisation: Internalised, Not internalised) between groups ANOVA was conducted with the 
outcome fairness scale as the dependent variable. No statistically significant main or interaction 
effects were found.   
Effects of victim presence, coercion and internalisation on outcome satisfaction. A 3 
(Victim presence: Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), x 2 (Coercion: Coerced, Not coerced), x 2 
(Internalisation: Internalised, Not internalised) between groups ANOVA was conducted with the 
outcome satisfaction scale as the dependent variable. No statistically significant main or 





Effects of victim presence, coercion and internalisation on transgression 
ramifications. Three individual continuous items were intended to measure the transgression 
ramifications construct. However, because reliability tests indicated low internal consistency 
among these items, the items are analysed separately here.     
I believe I was held accountable for my actions. A 3 (Victim presence: Direct, 
Surrogate, Ambiguous), x 2 (Coercion: Coerced, Not coerced), x 2 (Internalisation: Internalised, 
Not internalised) between groups ANOVA was conducted with this transgression accountability 
item as the dependent variable. No statistically significant main or interaction effects were found.   
It is not hard for me to see how my actions could have upset someone so much, given 
the consequences. A 3 (Victim presence: Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), x 2 (Coercion: 
Coerced, Not coerced), x 2 (Internalisation: Internalised, Not internalised) between groups 
ANOVA was conducted with this transgression consequences for others item as the dependent 
variable. No statistically significant main or interaction effects were found.    
I believe that the person/people that I offered my apology to exaggerated the impact my 
actions had on themselves or others. A 3 (Victim presence: Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), x 2 
(Coercion: Coerced, Not coerced), x 2 (Internalisation: Internalised, Not internalised) between 
groups ANOVA was conducted with this transgression exaggeration item as the dependent 
variable. There was a statistically significant main effect of internalisation on this measure, F(1, 
108) = 4.40, p = .04. The mean score in the internalised group (M = 3.68, SD = 1.92) was 
significantly higher than in the not internalised group (M = 2.83, SD = 1.68). The results indicate 
that participants who internalised responsibility for the transgression were more likely to believe 





compared to participants who did not internalise responsibility for the transgression. No further 
significant main effects were found, but a statistically significant interaction effect was found 
between coercion and internalisation, F(1, 108) = 6.19, p = .01 (see Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5 Coercion x internalisation on transgression exaggeration. 
 
 
Interaction of coercion and internalisation. Further t-tests revealed that, among 
participants who were coerced into apologising, those who had internalised responsibility for the 
transgression (M = 4.19, SD = 1.83) had significantly higher scores on transgression 
exaggeration than participants who had not internalised responsibility for the transgression (M = 
2.32, SD = 1.50; t(58) = -3.63, p = .001). So, while the main effect indicated that internalisation 
increased perceptions of transgression exaggeration, this was qualified by the two-way 
interaction: Internalisation increased perceptions that the person to whom an offender offered 
their apology exaggerated the impact of their actions, but only when the offender was coerced 
into apologising.  



































on transgression exaggeration among participants who did not internalise responsibility for the 
transgression, but when participants had internalised responsibility for the transgression, those in 
the coerced condition (M = 4.19, SD = 1.83) had significantly higher scores on transgression 
exaggeration than participants in the not coerced condition (M = 3.18, SD = 1.88; t(87) = -2.63, p 
= .01). The findings indicate that, when people internalised responsibility for their transgression, 
coercion to apologise increased perceptions that the person to whom they offered their apology 
exaggerated the impact of their actions.            
Effects of victim presence, coercion and internalisation on impact of apology. Three 
individual continuous items were intended to measure the impact of apology construct. Because 
reliability tests indicated low internal consistency among these items, the items were analysed 
separately.       
I would be confident in recommending the use of apology to a friend. A 3 (Victim 
presence: Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), x 2 (Coercion: Coerced, Not coerced), x 2 
(Internalisation: Internalised, Not internalised) between groups ANOVA was conducted with this 
apology recommendation item as the dependent variable. There was a statistically significant 
main effect of victim presence, F(2, 108) = 3.17, p = .05, but post hoc comparisons using the 
Tukey HSD test did not indicate statistically significant mean differences between groups. No 
further significant main effects were found. A statistically significant interaction effect was 
found between victim presence and internalisation, F(2, 108) = 3.98, p = .02.    
Interaction of victim presence and internalisation. Further one way ANOVAs revealed 
no significant effects of victim presence on apology recommendation among participants who 





transgression, there was a statistically significant difference in apology recommendation 
according to victim presence, F(2, 28) = 4.06, p = .03.  
 
 
Figure 6 Victim presence x internalisation on apology recommendation. 
 
 
Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that when participants did not 
internalise responsibility for the transgression, the mean score for participants in the surrogate 
victim condition (M = 5.57, SD = 1.05) was significantly lower than that of participants in the 
ambiguous victim condition (M = 6.83, SD = 0.41; p = .02). Participants in the direct victim 
condition (M = 6.55, SD = 0.69) did not differ significantly from either surrogate or ambiguous 
victim conditions. These findings indicate that participants who offered their apology to no one 
in particular would be more confident in recommending the use of apology to a friend than 
participants who offered their apology to a surrogate victim, but only when they did not 
internalise responsibility for committing the transgression. 
In addition, t-tests revealed that there were no significant effects of internalisation on 






































participants in the ambiguous victim condition had significantly lower scores on apology 
recommendation when they internalised responsibility for committing the transgression (M = 
6.03, SD = 1.05) than when they did not internalise responsibility for committing the 
transgression (M = 6.83, SD = 0.41; t(37.94) = 3.40, p = .002). These findings indicate that 
victim presence moderated the effect of internalisation on apology recommendation: Participants 
who internalised responsibility for the transgression were less confident in recommending the 
use of apology to a friend than those who did not internalise responsibility for the transgression, 
but this difference was only significant in the ambiguous victim condition.            
I thought that apologising seemed logical. A 3 (Victim presence: Direct, Surrogate, 
Ambiguous), x 2 (Coercion: Coerced, Not coerced), x 2 (Internalisation: Internalised, Not 
internalised) between groups ANOVA was conducted with this logic of apologising item as the 
dependent variable. No statistically significant main effects were found. A statistically 
significant interaction effect was found between victim presence and internalisation, F(2, 108) = 
4.31, p = .02.    
Interaction of victim presence and internalisation. Further one way ANOVAs revealed 
no significant effects of victim presence on logic of apologising among participants who did 
internalise the transgression, but among participants who did not internalise the transgression, 
there was a statistically significant difference in mean scores according to victim presence, F(2, 







Figure 7 Victim presence x internalisation on logic of apologising 
 
 
Post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that when participants did not 
internalise responsibility for the transgression, the mean score for participants in the surrogate 
victim condition (M = 5.29, SD = 1.13) was significantly lower than that of participants in the 
ambiguous victim condition (M = 6.67, SD = 0.67; p = .02). Participants in the direct victim 
condition (M = 6.43, SD = 0.93) did not differ significantly from either surrogate or ambiguous 
victim conditions. These findings indicate that participants who offered their apology to no one 
in particular thought that apologising seemed more logical than participants who offered their 
apology to a surrogate victim, but only when they did not internalise responsibility for 
committing the transgression. 
In addition, t-tests revealed that there were no significant effects of internalisation on 
logic of apologising among participants in the direct and ambiguous victim conditions, but 
participants in the surrogate victim condition had significantly lower scores on logic of 



































5.29, SD = 1.13) than when they internalised responsibility for committing the transgression (M 
= 6.40, SD = 0.77; t(38) = -3.01, p = .01). These findings indicate that victim presence moderated 
the effect of internalisation on logic of apologising. Participants who internalised responsibility 
for the transgression thought that apologising seemed more logical than those who did not 
internalise responsibility for the transgression, but this difference was only significant in the 
surrogate victim condition.            
I think that I will experience improvement in my situation as a result of apologising. A 
3 (Victim presence: Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), x 2 (Coercion: Coerced, Not coerced), x 2 
(Internalisation: Internalised, Not internalised) between groups ANOVA was conducted with this 
situation improvement item as the dependent variable. No statistically significant main or 














Chapter 4: Discussion 
 In this study, I explored how victim presence and coercion influence the outcome benefits 
of apology for apologisers. I hypothesised that the effect of victim presence would depend on 
coercion. When apologies were not coerced, I expected that outcome benefits would be greater 
when the apology was offered to a direct or surrogate victim compared to when it was offered to 
no one in particular. But, when apologies were coerced, I expected that outcome benefits would 
be consistently low and would not vary across victim presence conditions. This hypothesis was 
grounded in the assumption that coercion to apologise neutralises the cognitive dissonance that 
would have resulted from a voluntary apology, thus eliminating the individual‟s need to shift 
subsequent behaviour to align with the volunteered apology. As a result, I expected that coercion 
to apologise would prompt a floor effect, stunting any benefits associated with victim presence.  
 Manipulation checks suggest that the conditions were perceived by participants as I had 
intended. Participants who were coerced to offer an apology reported greater perceptions of 
coercion than did participants who were not coerced. Also, participants in the direct victim 
condition reported greater perceptions of victim familiarity overall than did participants in the 
surrogate and ambiguous victim conditions.  
Findings Supportive of Expectations  
 While the hypothesised interaction between victim presence and coercion on apology 
outcome benefits was not confirmed (indicating that the effect of victim presence was not 
dependent on coercion), findings suggest that victim presence and coercion affect apology 
outcome benefits independently, and largely in the ways that might be expected in light of 





 Victim presence. Greater outcome benefits were associated with direct victim presence. 
Participants in the direct victim condition indicated greater accountability for consequences than 
participants in the surrogate and ambiguous victim conditions. Furthermore, among participants 
who internalised the transgression, those who offered their apology directly to a victim reported 
greater perceptions of accountability than participants who offered their apology to no one in 
particular. Victim presence had a similar effect on procedural fairness evaluations. Participants in 
the direct victim condition reported greater procedural fairness evaluations than participants in 
the surrogate victim condition.  
Collectively, the effects of victim presence on accountability for consequences and 
procedural fairness tell a similar story: Direct victim presence offers the greatest outcome 
benefits. This finding is in line with literature relevant to the topic. Restorative justice theorists 
argue that the process of apologising, which is fundamental to a restorative conference, is most 
ideally expressed in a dyadic form – between an offender and victim (Taft, 2000). Restorative 
justice conferences are interaction rituals that are characterised by bringing people together 
(Sherman et al., 2005), and restorative justice theorists argue that it is this closeness that allows 
victims and offenders to work towards a common resolution because the presence of the victim 
helps offenders to recognise and acknowledge the harm that their actions caused (Umbreit, 
1998). In this study, the direct victim condition includes what restorative justice researchers 
consider to be a fundamental component of interaction rituals: Bringing people, specifically the 
victim and offender, physically together (Sherman et al., 2005). Physical closeness to the victim 
is absent in the surrogate and ambiguous victim conditions. This physical proximity to, and 
direct interaction with, the victim may have allowed participants in the direct victim condition to 





perceptions of accountability and procedural fairness. The results of the present study suggest 
that when a restorative justice conference fails to include a direct victim, the offender is less 
equipped to feel accountable for the consequences of the transgression or to perceive the 
procedure as fair. Cumulatively, the results reported above support Gray‟s (2005) assertion that 
restorative justice conferences function best when there is direct contact between an offender and 
victim.     
Coercion. The findings indicate mixed effects of coercion on apology. First, participants 
in the coerced condition indicated greater accountability for consequences than participants in 
the not coerced condition. This suggests that coercion is capable of producing greater outcome 
benefits for apologisers. However, when participants internalised responsibility for the 
transgression, coercion to apologise increased perceptions that the person to whom they offered 
their apology had exaggerated the impact of their actions. These findings may be interpreted as 
contradictory: Coercion led participants to feel greater accountability for the consequences of 
their actions, but also led participants to perceive that the impact of their transgression was being 
exaggerated. Referring to theories of self-perception and psychological reactance may shed some 
light on these results.   
I had predicted that, due to cognitive dissonance processes, coercion would attenuate the 
outcome benefits of an apology for an offender when that apology was offered under coercion. 
However, in contrast to cognitive dissonance theory, Bem‟s (1972) self-perception theory 
maintains that prior behaviour drives attitude formation. Self-perception theory differs from 
cognitive dissonance in that self-perception theory asserts that attitudes are modified without the 
aid of cognitive processes. Instead, self-perception theory suggests that an individual‟s attitudes 





perception theory suggests that the act of apologising alone is capable of prompting outcome 
benefits for the apologiser. This would lead us to expect that apologisers would experience 
outcome benefits (e.g., perceptions of accountability) in both the coerced and not coerced 
conditions and offers an explanation as to why coercion might not lead to a deficit in apology 
outcome benefits. Despite the presence of coercion, apologisers in this study experienced 
accountability for consequences, suggesting that coerced apologies are capable of prompting 
outcome benefits and supporting self-perception theory. However, it was not simply the case in 
this study that coerced apologies fared as well as apologies that were not coerced. Participants in 
the coerced condition actually reported greater accountability for consequences than participants 
in the not coerced condition. This may be due, in part, to the experimental manipulation of 
coercion in this study: The threat of misconduct issued in the coerced condition may have 
prompted participants to perceive the transgression to be more severe, and their accountability 
for it to be greater, than did participants in the not coerced condition.    
The effect of coercion on transgression exaggeration complicates the self-perception 
theory explanation, but psychological reactance may also play into this effect. Brehm‟s (1966) 
theory of psychological reactance is concerned with behavioural responses to encroachments 
upon personal freedom. Reactance is the behavioural and cognitive response a person 
experiences when their freedom is threatened. In response to a perceived loss of freedom, a 
person will strive to re-establish freedom through reactance: opposition and resistance (Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981). Psychological reactance has received considerable empirical support: People tend 
to move away from positions that are forcibly forwarded (Worchel & Brehm, 1970); 





most relevant, reactance prompts people to dismiss and reject information as well as its source 
(Miller, Lane, Deatrick, Young & Potts, 2007).  
The effect of coercion on transgression exaggeration in this study may be the result of 
reactance.  In other words, coercion may be perceived as a threat to one‟s freedom, prompting 
offenders to minimise the implications of the transgression through assumptions of exaggeration. 
Thus, the offender is able to contextualise the situation in a way that might allow perceptions of 
encroachments upon personal freedom to be reduced. Operating under coercion, it is conceivable 
that an offender would feel accountable for their actions while also perceiving that their 
transgression was being exaggerated. Coercion may encourage the offender to offer an apology 
for instrumental reasons – as a way for the offender to resolve this conflict with minimal 
negative consequences for themselves. An apology offered wholly for instrumental reasons loses 
its effect as a meaningful interaction (Petrucci, 2002; Taft, 2000). Ultimately, therefore, the 
results suggest that coercion may negatively influence an offender‟s ability to experience 
outcome benefits of an apology offered in a restorative conference.  
Internalisation. Finally, internalisation significantly impacted perceived voice. I had not 
originally posited a hypothesis about the effects of internalisation because it was not intended to 
serve as a third independent variable in the analyses in this study. It was included as a third 
independent variable after a moderate number (n = 31) of participants were coded as not having 
internalised the transgression, so that I could explore differences in apology outcome benefits 
between participants who had and had not internalised responsibility. Participants who did not 
internalise responsibility for committing the transgression indicated that they were able to 





Explaining the relationship between internalisation and perceived voice may be aided by 
considering the literature on suspect strategies during interrogations. The interrogation literature 
has consistently found that innocent suspects are considerably more willing to talk during 
interrogations than are guilty suspects. Kassin (2005) offers two potential explanations for the 
consistent finding that innocent people tend to invoke voice during interrogations more than 
guilty people: (1) the just world hypothesis, and (2) the illusion of transparency. Lerner (1980) 
introduced the just world hypothesis as a generalised human assumption that outcomes received 
are founded in deservingness. In the case of innocent interrogations, the belief in a just world 
forwards the assumption that innocent people having nothing to hide and therefore nothing to 
fear. The “illusion of transparency” runs in a similar vein to the just world hypothesis, 
contending that we tend to assume others are aware of our inner thoughts and feelings (Miller & 
McFarland, 1987). In the case of innocent interrogations, the illusion of transparency suggests 
that innocent people are more likely to invoke voice to demonstrate their honesty to 
interrogators. This strategy of invoking voice is employed because of a general assumption in the 
transparency of innocence: Innocent people tend to believe they can reveal and display their 
innocence through truth telling (Hartwig, Granhag & Stromwall, 2006; Kassin, 2005; Kassin & 
Norwick, 2004).  
Both of these explanations are equally viable in the context of this study. In my study, 
participants coded as not internalised are comparable to innocent suspects – these participants 
believed that the computer had legitimately crashed but did not confidently vocalise that the 
crash was their fault. Conversely, participants coded as internalised are comparable to guilty 
suspects – these participants accepted the belief that the computer had legitimately crashed and 





transparency” are both psychological mechanisms that encourage a desire among innocent 
people to invoke voice. As a result, participants who believed that they were innocent of the 
transgression (i.e., those who did not internalise the transgression in my study) may have actually 
invoked voice more than guilty (i.e. internalised) participants. Despite the fact that all 
participants in this study were given equal opportunities to voice their opinions to the 
experimenter directly and to the victim in their apology letter, participants who believed that they 
were innocent (i.e. those who did not internalise responsibility for the transgression in my study) 
may have taken greater advantage of those opportunities – for example, writing longer and more 
detailed apology letters to their victims than did participants who believed that they were guilty 
(i.e., those who did internalise the transgression in my study). This behaviour would be 
consistent with the significantly greater perceptions of voice among participants who did not 
internalise the transgression, but I cannot determine that more expressive apology letters were 
related to greater perceptions of voice based solely on the results presently analysed. However, in 
future research I could analyse participants‟ written apologies to test for significant differences 
between the lengths of apologies offered by participants who did and did not internalise 
responsibility for the transgression. A follow-up study may shed light on whether participants 
who did not internalise responsibility for the transgression actually exercised the opportunity for 
voice to a greater extent than participants who did internalise responsibility, thereby explaining 
the discrepancy in perceived voice across internalisation groups. 
Findings Contrary to Expectations  
 While some findings confirmed my expectations of the effects of the independent 





 Victim presence. Several sets of findings contradicted my expectations regarding the 
effect of victim presence on apology outcome benefits. First, among participants who did not 
internalise responsibility for the transgression, those who offered their apologies to no one in 
particular compared to a surrogate victim reported: (1) greater perceptions of personal 
responsibility, (2) increased confidence in recommending the use of apology to a friend, and (3) 
greater endorsement of the logic of apologising. The findings for these variables tell a consistent 
(though surprising) story: Among participants who did not internalise responsibility for the 
transgression, ratings of personal responsibility, apology recommendation, and logic of 
apologising were all significantly higher when participants apologised to no one in particular 
compared to a representative of the victim. Because this set of findings relates to participants 
who did not internalise responsibility, the results are of lesser concern – in this study, I was 
primarily interested in those participants who did internalise the transgression and who therefore 
most closely represent the target population of offenders taking part in restorative justice 
conferences. However, the consistency of these findings makes them noteworthy.  
The data suggest that when people are not genuinely convinced that they are at fault for 
an incident, they benefit more from minimal victim presence. These findings have implications 
for the literature on public apologies. Apologies delivered publicly by corporate representatives 
or political leaders are often delivered to de-identified (or ambiguous) victims. While public 
apologies are often seen as necessary to ensure the maintenance of social relationships, the act of 
apologising can also hamper perceptions of the apologiser‟s ability to perform their public role 
(Kampf, 2009). In an attempt to temper negative perceptions, those delivering public apologies 
tend to attribute responsibility for harm caused to external circumstances (Kampf, 2009). 





(Kim, Dirks, Cooper & Ferrin, 2006). In this way, public apologisers may be similar to 
participants in this study who did not internalise responsibility for the transgression: Both groups 
acknowledge and accept that harm was done, but they also do not vocalise that the harm was 
their fault. Despite this recognisable distancing of themselves from the harm caused, participants 
in my study who did not internalise responsibility for the transgression reported significantly 
greater perceptions of personal responsibility, apology recommendation, and logic of apology 
when they had apologised to no one in particular than when they had apologised to a victim 
representative. The results of this study suggest that apologisers who do not internalise 
responsibility for a transgression are actually able to reap greater outcome benefits from 
apologising when victim presence is minimised. Therefore, internalisation may play an important 
role in conjunction with victim presence in affecting apology outcome benefits: I had expected 
that greater victim presence would result in greater apology outcome benefits, but this 
expectation was grounded in an assumption of transgression internalisation. It may be the case 
that minimal victim presence is the optimal condition for apologisers to experience outcome 
benefits of apology when they have not internalised responsibility for the transgression. 
Second, among participants in the surrogate victim condition, those who internalised 
responsibility for the transgression reported: (1) greater perceptions of personal responsibility, 
and (2) greater support for the logic of apologising than did participants who did not internalise 
responsibility. It may be that the surrogate victim condition has the capacity to reveal the effect 
of internalisation on the dependent variables of personal responsibility and logic of apologising. 
In the direct victim condition, the means for internalised and not internalised participants are 
consistently high on these dependent variables, indicating that when the victim is present, 





ambiguous victim condition the means for internalised and not internalised participants are 
consistently low on these dependent measures, indicating that when the victim is absent and is 
not represented, perceptions of personal responsibility and logic of apologising are consistently 
low. However, in the surrogate victim condition there seems to be enough variance in the 
dependent measures to reveal the effect of internalisation. Adding to the discussion about the 
effects of victim presence and internalisation on outcome benefits, it appears that participants 
who have the opportunity to recognise the victim through a victim representative reap greater 
outcome benefits when they have internalised responsibility than when they have not.    
Third, and building upon the two sets of results just discussed, participants in the 
ambiguous victim condition who internalised responsibility for the transgression were less 
confident in recommending the use of apology to a friend than those who did not internalise. 
This finding may support the argument that, when offenders have internalised responsibility for 
the transgression, absence of the victim offers offenders limited opportunities to reap outcome 
benefits from apologising. Failure to unite the offender with a victim seems particularly 
detrimental to apology recommendation among participants in this study who internalised 
responsibility for the transgression. This finding may be rooted in the outcome of a failed 
interaction ritual between the offender and victim. Failing to have any sort of meaningful contact 
with the victim appears to be particularly detrimental to the offender who has internalised 
responsibility for a transgression.          
Finally, there were no significant effects of the independent variables on a number of the 
dependent variables. The reason for these null effects may be that the procedure in which 
participants took part was too subtle to prompt recognisable differences between experimental 





additional time permitted to conference participants might generate stronger effects of victim 
presence and coercion. For example, participants in this study had relatively little at stake when 
compared to offenders in a restorative justice conference. While participants in the coerced 
condition were exposed to the possibility of serious negative consequences for their 
transgression, the threat of academic misconduct still carries different long-term and real-world 
ramifications than a criminal record. Greater consequences may prompt greater personal 
investment in a procedure, producing greater variance across coercion conditions on dependent 
variables such as transgression finality and situation improvement. Further, participants in this 
study spent a relatively short time (less than five minutes) discussing the consequences of this 
transgression for the victim. In a restorative justice conference, implications of the harmful 
behaviour would be a centrepiece of the conversation and would likely consume a much greater 
amount of time. With more time for the offender to consider the viewpoint of the victim, we may 
see greater and more consistent differences across victim presence conditions on dependent 
variables such as the ability to achieve value consensus. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
While this study incorporates an innovative and engaging procedure and offers 
interesting findings, it is important to bear in mind several limitations of the research. First, 
analysis of the victim familiarity manipulation check presented a problematic finding: Among 
participants who internalised responsibility for the transgression, victim presence had no effect 
on ratings of victim familiarity. This finding is problematic because it suggests that the victim 
presence manipulation check was not fully effective among participants who internalised 
responsibility for the transgression. However, all of the participants whose data were analysed in 





of participants to correctly respond to this manipulation check suggests that the victim presence 
manipulation was registered by participants as intended, but when participants were asked to 
indicate their familiarity with the victim on a continuous measure, direct interaction with the 
victim did not equate to significantly greater victim familiarity ratings. In future research, we 
should consider the extent of interaction needed between an offender and previously unknown 
victim before significant effects on victim familiarity ratings are established.              
Second, while this study was engaging for participants, it can be criticised for lacking 
ecological validity. Ecological validity is the extent to which experimental studies mimic a real 
life experience when studying various phenomena (Bronfenrenner, 1977). Ecological validity 
can be enhanced by ensuring that the experimental environment, examined stimuli and behaviour 
of interest are all relevant, important and natural to the phenomenon under study in real life. The 
deceptive nature of this study was intended to contribute to the emotional realism of the 
experience, which is an important component of ecological validity (Brunswick, 1943). 
However, one important difference between the situation in which participants engaged in the 
current study and the real-world situation to which we seek to generalise these findings is that in 
the real-world situation, offenders are often participating in restorative justice procedures for 
offences which they have committed deliberately. This paradigm allowed me to convince 
participants that they had committed a transgression, but I did not attempt to convince them that 
they had done so deliberately. While this element of the experimental design may limit the extent 
to which the findings of this study can be generalised to the experiences of actual offenders, it is 
important to bear in mind that some offenders do approach restorative conferences with degrees 
of externalisation, experiencing emotional responses to the transgression such as indignation and 





deliberately committed, the offender may believe that he or she is not fully at fault – that 
circumstance influenced their behaviour. This element of externalisation makes the distinction 
between accidentally and deliberately committed offences less clear.  
However, one way to increase the ecological validity of this research in the future would 
be to study deliberately committed transgressions as opposed to those which are accidental. 
Future research might consider whether apology outcome benefits for apologisers are 
experienced differently based on offender intention – accidental versus deliberate. The design of 
the present study might be suitably modified to test for a difference in deliberately versus 
accidentally committed transgressions. In a condition in which a participant commits the 
transgression deliberately, a confederate might encourage the participant to purposefully hit the 
ALT key, expressing scepticism about the experimenter‟s assertion regarding the “glitch” in the 
system and coaxing the participant to test the experimenter‟s warning. Use of this paradigm 
would offer some insight into the outcome benefits of apology for deliberately committed 
transgressions.         
Third, and as mentioned earlier, in this study coercion may have been confounded with 
offence seriousness. In the coerced condition, participants were told that if they failed to 
apologise, this would have very serious consequences for them (i.e., a misconduct violation that 
could affect their standing at the university). This consequence may have led participants to 
perceive that the transgression itself was more serious than in the not coerced condition, where 
participants were told that there would be no consequences for them if they did not apologise. 
Future research should continue to explore the effects of coercion on apology by isolating 
coercion itself more effectively in a deceptive experimental paradigm. A future study might 





condition: Instead of threatening participants with a serious negative consequence, the 
experimenter might simply tell the participant that they must write a letter of apology before they 
leave the lab. This procedural change should eliminate possible differences in perceived offence 
seriousness between coercion conditions, and would provide a more accurate and specific 
assessment of the effects of coercion.  
Implications for Restorative Justice  
There were no significant interaction effects between victim presence and coercion on the 
dependent variables. While the findings of this study therefore do not support the hypothesis that 
the effects of victim presence depend on coercion, I did find that both victim presence and 
coercion influence outcome benefits of apology for apologisers independently. As such, victim 
presence and coercion need to be considered when constructing and conducting restorative 
justice procedures.  
The findings associated with victim presence support Gray‟s (2005) assertion that 
restorative justice conferences function best when there is direct contact between an offender and 
victim. With ratings of accountability for consequences and procedural fairness highest when 
direct victims are included in the procedure, I find support for arguments that emphasize the 
importance of direct victim presence in restorative justice conferences (for example, Gray, 2005; 
Taft, 2000; Umbreit, 1998). It seems that the ability of restorative procedures to foster 
accountability and resolve the conflict in a way that is perceived as procedurally fair is best 
achieved with an actual victim in attendance. The inclusion of victims in restorative procedures 





theoretical underpinnings of restorative justice regarding victim presence:  Victims should be 
included in restorative procedures whenever possible.  
Given that restorative conferences sometimes occur where the direct victim(s) are either 
unwilling or unable to attend, I had suggested that inviting a surrogate victim to attend the 
conference might be a viable means to enhance apology outcome benefits for offenders. I did not 
find full support for this suggestion. Surrogate victim presence did seem to serve as something of 
a middle ground between the direct and ambiguous victim conditions when it came to generating 
accountability for the consequences of a transgression among offenders. When participants had 
internalised responsibility for the transgression, those in the direct victim condition reported 
significantly higher ratings of accountability for consequences than participants in the ambiguous 
victim condition, but participants in the surrogate victim condition did not differ significantly 
from either direct or ambiguous conditions. So, while surrogate victim presence was not more 
advantageous than ambiguous victim presence, it was not significantly worse than direct victim 
presence either. Collectively, the lack of significant difference between surrogate victim 
presence and both the direct and ambiguous conditions on this dependent variable, and the mixed 
effects of surrogate victim presence on other dependent variables suggests that the role of 
surrogate victim presence in restorative justice conferences warrants further exploration. If 
victim presence plays an important role in restorative justice procedures, as our findings suggest, 
than it is necessary to consider alternative forms of victim presence in restorative conferences 
that would otherwise have no victim present.     
While coercion increased perceptions of accountability for consequences, it also 
prompted apologisers to believe that the people around them were exaggerating the 





are more nuanced than I had initially predicted, and that in restorative justice procedures 
coercion can be beneficial in some ways and detrimental in others. It may be the case that 
coercion in restorative justice procedures fosters outcome benefits for offenders by simply 
encouraging pro-social behaviour but that it also limits outcome benefits by engaging 
psychological reactance. Restorative justice theoretically condemns coercion, contending that 
offenders must accept full responsibility for their offences and desires to repair the harm caused 
in a conference. However, in practical applications of restorative justice, coercion is sometimes 
employed. Based on the results of this study, I can conclude that coercion wields some influence 
over offender perceptions and experiences during restorative justice conferences, but I cannot 
state conclusively or specifically what effect this coercion has on offenders. Therefore, I 
recommend that the effects of coercion in the context of restorative justice continue to be 
explored. Future experimental research might consider coercion more closely, testing the 
underlying psychological mechanisms by which it affects apology outcome benefits in 
restorative justice conferences.       
Conclusions 
 Through this research, I sought to build upon our existing knowledge of the outcome 
benefits of apology for apologisers in restorative justice procedures. This exploratory study 
employed an engaging experimental design and produced interesting results. The findings 
suggest that the presence of an actual victim in a restorative conference is important to offender 
perceptions of accountability and procedural fairness, though the degree to which the offender 
has internalised responsibility for the transgression may qualify the importance of victim 
presence during the apology. The findings associated with coercion are more nuanced, and 





ultimately may not be conducive to outcome benefits for offenders. In summary, the findings 
generally demonstrate that the way in which restorative justice is practiced (specifically, whether 
victims are present and whether offenders are coerced to apologise) does have important effects 
on the outcome benefits of apology for offenders. These findings warrant continued 
investigations into how the practice of restorative justice procedures and the delivery of 
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Appendix A: Typing History Questionnaire 
 
Record your answers to the following questions by using the response categories provided or 
writing your response (to the best of your recollection). 
Did you have a computer in your home as a child?           YES    NO 
If so, in approximately what year did you first have a computer in your                  
primary residence?               ________ 
Approximately what age did you first start typing?            ________ 
Approximately how many years have you been typing?           ________ 
Do you have a computer in your residence during the school year?        YES    NO 
Do you ever use computers located on campus?           YES    NO 
Do you regularly use a computer to complete your school assignments?        YES    NO 
Have you ever had a job that involved primarily working on a computer?        YES    NO    
If given the option, would you prefer to type a letter, as opposed to handwriting?       YES    NO 
Would you be able to type a letter faster than you could handwrite it?        YES    NO 
What would you estimate your typing speed, in words per minute, to be?         ________ 
On a scale from 1 – 10 (with 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest) how                     
would you rate your typing skill in regards to… 
 Accuracy  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Speed 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
On a scale from 1 – 10 (with 1 representing 10% and 10 representing 100%)                           
what percentage of UOIT‟s students would you estimate to type slower than you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
On a scale from 1 – 10 (with 1 representing 10% and 10 representing 100%) what          
percentage of UOIT‟s students would you estimate to type less accurately than you? 





Appendix B: Typing Test Materials 
DIRECTIONS 
While completing the typing test be sure to include proper case and grammar. Sentences should 
be typed with all grammar as it appears below. The reader is responsible for indicating to the 
typist exactly where punctuation is located in the sentences.  
MATERIALS 
The cat lived in the hat but came out for bats. 
St. Petersburg is the capital of both Florida and Russia. 
Using chicken in tacos is a tasty substitute for beef. 
Mandy might be moody but maybe she‟s just missing Mike. 
The most common source of student anxiety stems from ineffective time management skills. 
When you travel, always be sure to carry your personal identification in case of an emergency. 
Although Easter is nice and Christmas is charming, my favourite holiday is Halloween, even 
though it can be alarming. 
Jumping Jack Sprat lost his hat but found it again in the corner. 
Mrs. Black‟s dog, Max, knows how to sit, stay, stand and come. 
It goes without question that Charles Dickens was a master of the written word. 
The children who are the happiest are those who listen to their Mothers. 
While winter days are freezing cold, summer days are fun to behold. 
In the pursuit of knowledge we must wonder how it feels to be bored. 
When considering future careers you should place great weight on your personal aptitudes. 
Did you know the most popular name for a cat in the United States is Kitty? 
If you don‟t like the team, you should get out of the stadium. 
So shines a good dead in a weary world. 
Falling in a dream is the most common nightmare from which people wake. 





Appendix C-1: Lost Data Protocol (Coerced) 
 
7B: Procedure for Irretrievable Data 
Loss of data is a serious issue that must be reported immediately. 
Data that has been terminally lost delays research progress, decreases sample size, 
contributes to skewed results and may impact project funding.  
If, for any reason, there is a loss of data during your shift you are to contact the lab supervisor 
without delay. 
If the lab supervisor is not present at the time of the incident, you are to make direct 
contact or leave a message at Extension #579. 
Understand that, dependent upon the situation, a loss of data can result in: 
- Academic Misconduct Violations for participants 
- Experimenter termination  
- Study cancellation  





























Appendix C-2: Lost Data Protocol (Not coerced) 
 
7B: Procedure for Irretrievable Data 
Loss of data is a serious issue that must be reported immediately. 
Data that has been terminally lost delays research progress, decreases sample size, 
contributes to skewed results and may impact project funding.  
If, for any reason, there is a loss of data during your shift you are to contact the lab supervisor 
without delay. 
If the lab supervisor is not present at the time of the incident, you are to make direct 
contact or leave a message at Extension #579. 
Understand that, dependent upon the situation, a loss of data can result in: 
- Experimenter termination  
- Study cancellation  































Appendix D-1: “Alternative Study” Questionnaire 
 
(Questions organised by construct)  
Victim Manipulation Check 
(1) I offered a verbal or written apology to the victim of my actions, and met with him or her in 
person. 
   I offered a verbal or written apology to the victim of my actions by name, but never met with 
him or her in person.  
   I offered a verbal or written apology for my actions, but it was not addressed to a specific 
victim by name.  
 
(Select the correct answer) 
(2) I am familiar with the victim of my actions.  
(Scale of 1-7, Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree)  
Apology Prompt Manipulation Check 




(Select the correct answer) 
(4) If I had not apologised, there would have been some negative consequence for me. 
  (Scale of 1-7, Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree)  
When responding to the following statements, think of the transgression you committed, 
which led to you offering your apology.  
(Scale of 1-7, Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) 
Internalisation of responsibility  
(7) Circumstances, not me, are responsible for the situation.  
(9) The blame for the situation lies with me.  
(5) The blame for the situation lies in the circumstances, not with me.   





(6) I am remorseful.    
When responding to the following statements, think about the circumstances leading up to 
your apology.  
(Scale of 1-7, Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) 
Responsibilisation 
(13) I became nervous because the person / people present at the time of my actions seemed to be 
nervous.   
(17) I believe that the person / people that I offered my apology to exaggerated the impact my 
actions had on themselves or others.                                                                                                                                            
(12) It is not hard for me to see how my actions could have upset someone so much, given the 
consequences.      
(16) I became more sympathetic than irritated when I learned about the impact of my actions                                  
(14) I became upset because I believed the person impacted by my actions was going to get 
upset. 
(18) Knowing that my actions were going to impact someone else upset me.                                                            
(19) I could not continue to feel okay following my actions because I knew someone was going 
to be negatively impacted by them.                                                                                                                                                    
(11) It upset me to know the negative impact my actions had on someone else.                                                        
(15) I made my decision to apologise because I was influenced by the feelings of the person / 
people I had impacted by my actions.                                                                                                                                           
(10) I believe that I was held accountable for my actions. 
When responding to the following statements, think about the apology that you offered.  
(Scale of 1-7, Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) 
Impact of apology 
(24) I thought that apologising seemed logical.  
(21) I would be confident in recommending the use of apology to a friend. 





Transgression finality  
(23) I think that my apology will successfully resolve my dispute.  
(20) I think that my apology will completely resolve my dispute. 
 When responding to the following questions, think of your interaction with the 
victim of your actions.    
(Scale of 1-7, Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) 
Value Consensus 
(29) I feel this person agreed with me on principles of decent conduct. 
(26) I feel this person and I share the same values.  
(25) I feel like this person rejects values widely shared in our community. 
(28) I feel this person ignores a broadly accepted understanding of what is right and wrong. 
(27) I feel like this person disregards commonly shared beliefs and values. 
 
When responding to the following questions, think of your interaction with the person to 
whom you offered your apology.    
(Scale of 1-7, Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) 
Voice 
(35) I had the ability to voice my opinions during the interaction that prompted my apology. 
Procedural Fairness 
(34) This person treated me unfairly during our encounter. 
(33) This person behaved fairly toward me during our encounter. 
(39) I was treated the way I deserved to be treated during our encounter.  
Procedural Satisfaction 
(31) I was satisfied with my encounter with this person.   






(30) The outcome of my encounter with this person was fair. 
(40) The encounter produced a fair result. 
(38) The outcome of my encounter with this person was not fair.  
Outcome Satisfaction  
(32) I was satisfied with the outcome produced by this encounter.   
(37) I was pleased with the outcome that resulted from this encounter.   
Demographic Variables 
Sex: (circle one) 
Male  Female 
Age: _____ 
Ethnic origin: My Ethnic Background is (circle one): 
White/Caucasian   Hispanic / Chicano(a) / Latino(a) 
 Black / African-American  Pacific Islander    
 Native American   Asian     







Appendix D-2: “Alternative Study” Questionnaire 
 
(Questions as presented to participants)  
When responding to the following questions, think about the situation that prompted you 
to apologise and the person or people you apologised to.  
(Scale of 1-7, Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) 
1. Circle the response that most accurately describes your apology…   
a) I offered a verbal or written apology to the victim of my actions, and met with him or 
her in person. 
b) I offered a verbal or written apology to the victim of my actions by name, but never 
met with him or her in person.  
c) I offered a verbal or written apology for my actions, but it was not addressed to a 
specific victim by name.  
 
2. I am familiar with the victim of my actions.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 




4. If I had not apologised, there would have been some negative consequence for me. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
When responding to the following statements, think of the transgression you committed, 
which led to you offering your apology.  





5. The blame for the situation lies in the circumstances, not with me. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
6. I am remorseful.    
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
7. Circumstances, not me, are responsible for the situation. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
8. I believe what I did was wrong. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
9. The blame for the situation lies with me.     
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
When responding to the following statements, think about the circumstances leading up to 
your apology.  
(Scale of 1-7, Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) 
10. I believe that I was held accountable for my actions.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  






11. It upset me to know the negative impact my actions had on someone else.                                                         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
 
12. It is not hard for me to see how my actions could have upset someone so much, given the 
consequences.       
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
13. I became nervous because the person / people present at the time of my actions seemed to be 
nervous.                                   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
14. I became upset because I believed the person impacted by my actions was going to get upset.                          
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
15. I made my decision to apologise because I was influenced by the feelings of the person / 
people I had impacted by my actions.                                                                                                                                            
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  






16. I became more sympathetic than irritated when I learned about the impact of my actions.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
17. I believe that the person / people that I offered my apology to exaggerated the impact my 
actions had on themselves or others.                                                                                                                                                 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
18. Knowing that my actions were going to impact someone else upset me.                                                              
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
19. I could not continue to feel okay following my actions because I knew someone was going to 
be negatively impacted by them.                                                                                                                                                       
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
When responding to the following statements, think about the apology that you offered.  
(Scale of 1-7, Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) 
20. I think that my apology will completely resolve my dispute.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 





 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
22. I thought that apologising seemed logical 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
23. I think that my apology will successfully resolve my dispute.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
24. I think that I will experience improvement in my situation as a result of apologising. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
 When responding to the following questions, think of the victim of your actions.    
(Scale of 1-7, Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) 
25. I feel like this person rejects values widely shared in our community. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
26. I feel this person and I share the same values.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 





 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
28. I feel this person ignores a broadly accepted understanding of what is right and wrong. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
29. I feel this person agrees with me on principles of decent conduct.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  




When responding to the following questions, think of your interaction with the person to 
whom you offered your apology.    
(Scale of 1-7, Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) 
30. The outcome of my encounter with this person was fair. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
31. I was satisfied with my encounter with this person.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
32.  I was satisfied with the outcome produced by this encounter. 





Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
33. This person behaved fairly toward me during our encounter. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
34. This person treated me unfairly during our encounter 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
35. I had the ability to voice my opinions during the interaction that prompted my apology.   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
 
36. I was pleased with my encounter with this person. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
37. I was pleased with the outcome that resulted from this encounter.   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
38. The outcome of my encounter with this person was not fair.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  






39. I was treated the way I deserved to be treated during our encounter.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
 
40. The encounter produced a fair result.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly Disagree         Neutral        Strongly Agree 
Demographic Variables 
Sex: (circle one) 
Male  Female 
Age: _____ 
Ethnic origin: My Ethnic Background is (circle one): 
White/Caucasian   Hispanic / Chicano(a) / Latino(a) 
 Black / African-American  Pacific Islander    
 Native American   Asian     














Appendix E: Informed Consent Form 
You are invited to voluntarily participate in the following research project: Typing Task.  
In this experiment, you were involved in an initial task, the Typing Task, which seemed to 
experience loss of data that you were told was due to your actions (ie, hitting the ALT key). You 
were asked to sign a confession and write an apology. Following the apology, you were asked to 
complete a questionnaire asking about how that apology affected you. We expect that it will have 
taken 40-45 minutes for you to complete this study. 
 
There are no known physical, psychological, economic, or social risks associated with this study.  
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may withdraw from this study at 
any time without any consequences or penalties. You are not obliged to answer any questions 
that you find objectionable or which make you uncomfortable.  
 
You will be given one credit for your participation in this study. Full credit will be awarded 
whether you completed the study or not. 
 
All information will be stored in a secure area. Individual responses will remain anonymous and 
will not be released to professors or in publications. Only group results will be reported (e.g., 
conference presentations, journal articles). Dr. Diane Sivasubramaniam and her research 
assistants will be responsible for keeping and analysing the anonymous data files based on your 
responses. Also, other researchers could request to analyse these anonymous files for other valid 
research purposes (e.g., for meta-analyses).   
 
This study has been reviewed and cleared by the Research Ethics Board at UOIT (REB # 10-
035). The principal investigator is Alana Saulnier of the Faculty of Social Science and 
Humanities, under the supervision of Dr. Diane Sivasubramaniam of the Faculty of Social 
Sciences and Humanities, UOIT. In the event that you have any questions, concerns, or 
complaints, you may contact Dr. Diane Sivasubramaniam (diane.sivasubramaniam@uoit.ca), or 
the REB Administration (compliance@uoit.ca; 905-721-8668, ext. 3693). 
 
I have read and understood the statements above. My signature, below, indicates my free and informed 
consent to participate in this research. 
Name (please print):  _______________________________ 









Appendix F: Debrief Form 
Thank you for participating in this study! 
 
The study that you participated in today was designed to test a question about Restorative Justice 
Conferencing procedures. These procedures seek to bring together victims, offenders, and their 
supporters to discuss an offence with the guidance of a conference convener. During these 
procedures offenders are asked to apologise to their victims but the actual victim(s) of their 
offence may be unable or unwilling to participate. This differs significantly from a court 
procedure. In a court procedure, (1) offenders are never required to issue an apology for their 
actions, and (2) victims are given little to no opportunity to be involved in the justice process or 
outcomes. 
 
Some evaluations have shown that, after a transgression has occurred, Restorative Justice is a 
satisfactory and rewarding resolution for all parties involved. Most research focuses on victim 
benefits of restorative justice, but our research considers benefits for the offender.  
 
Research on the effects of apology has shown that sincere apologies hold many benefits for 
apologizers. However, will an offender experience those benefits to the same degree, if (a) an 
apology is offered only for instrumental means (i.e. to avoid the possibility of a more formal 
sanction), or (b) an offender is not able to offer their apology directly to the victim but must 
express the apology to a representative of the victim? 
 
The study in which you participated today is designed to test these questions.  
 
We manipulated two factors in this experiment: 
 
- Victim presence: One third of our participants saw a direct victim, who claimed to be the 
person most directly impacted by the loss of data. One third of our participants saw a 
surrogate victim, who described the victim and claimed that individual was going to be 
the person most directly impacted by the loss of data. One third of our participants 
experienced an ambiguous victim condition, in which it was simply stated that the loss of 
data was going to impact ongoing research.  
 
- Apology prompt: One half of our participants were prompted to give an apology by being 
told that an apology would be appreciated. One half of our participants were prompted to 
give an apology by being told that their actions potentially warranted an academic 
misconduct violation and that an apology would likely avoid escalating the incident to 
this level.  
 
We manipulated these two things because we want to investigate how people react to offering an 
apology when they have a strong incentive to apologize (compared to apologizing voluntarily) 
and when they are offering the apology to a victim representative, or an “ambiguous”, nameless 
victim (compared to directly apologizing to the actual victim). 
 
We hypothesised that, when apologies are offered without incentive, apologisers will be more 





surrogate victim is present for the apology, the apologiser will be more likely to experience the 
benefits than when no victim is present. Lastly, we hypothesise that, the effect of victim presence 
on apology outcome benefits for the offender depends on whether the apology is offered under 
incentive or not. When the apology is not offered under an incentive, victim presence has an 
effect on benefits – outcome benefits are greater when the apology is delivered to a direct or 
surrogate victim than when the apology is directed to no one in particular. However, when the 
apology is offered under an incentive, victim presence has no effect on benefits – outcome 
benefits are no different when the apology is delivered to a direct victim, surrogate victim, or no 
one in particular.  
 
It is important to note that this study involved some deception.  
 
- First, you were asked to complete a typing task today. This study was not actually about 
typing ability – the typing task was intended to distract you from the real purpose of the 
experiment. You were also told that hitting the ALT key would cause experimental data 
to be lost. This was not true. Hitting the ALT key during the experiment did not cause 
any data to be lost. The program was pre-programmed to “crash” at a particular time.   
- You were told that there was another participant working with you. This was not true. 
You are the only participant in the experimental session. The other person completing the 
typing task was a confederate of the experimenter, and behaved towards you in a way that 
was predetermined by the experimenter. Specifically, the confederate said that you had 
hit the ALT key, when you actually did not.  
- You were told that your actions potentially warranted a violation of academic conduct. 
This was not true. You are not responsible for any academic misconduct as a result of this 
experiment and no action will be taken against you.    
- You were asked to participate in a “separate study” about transgressions and apologies. 
This was not a separate study at all, but part of the study that you signed up for today. In 
this study, you completed a questionnaire about how you felt after offering an apology – 
it is from this questionnaire that we will get our data about how apology affected you, 
depending on the condition to which you had been randomly assigned. The person who 
gave you that questionnaire also asked you what happened in the Typing Task study – 
your reply to that person was audio recorded, and we will use that reply as an indication 
of whether you really believed that you had crashed the computer in the typing task study 
today. 
 
 If you have any additional questions, please feel free to stay and discuss them with us now or to 
contact Alana Saulnier at alana.saulnier@uoit.ca or Dr. Diane Sivasubramaniam at 
diane.sivasubramaniam@uoit.ca.  
 
Thank you again for your participation and assistance with our research! 
 
Alana Saulnier and Diane Sivasubramaniam 
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities  
University of Ontario Institute of Technology 
